Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 21

Issue 3

Article 1

7-1-2004

Trinity and Polytheism
Edward Wierenga

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Wierenga, Edward (2004) "Trinity and Polytheism," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 21 : Iss. 3 , Article 1.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200421324
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

TRINITY AND POLYTHEISM
Edward Wierenga

This paper develops an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, drawn
from Augustine and the Athanasian Creed. Such a doctrine includes Divinity
Claims (the persons are divine), Diversity Claims (the persons are distinct),
and a Uniqueness Claim (there is only one God). I propose and defend an
interpretation of these theses according to which they are neither logically
incompatible nor do they do entail that there are three (or four) Gods.

According to St. Thomas, "when we speak of the Trinity we must speak
with care and with befitting modesty/'l and he appeals to Augustine's
remark that "nowhere else is the error more dangerous, the search more
laborious, and the results more rewarding." 2 The possibility for error certainly looms large, especially in view of the number of named heresies that
have developed around the doctrine of the Trinity. And the fact that the
best theologians of every age have grappled with this doctrine without
diminishing its mystery, surely makes modesty in addressing it befitting.
Nevertheless, it is tempting to try at least to disarm some objections to the
doctrine of the Trinity, and that will be my aim in this paper.

1. Augustine on the Trinity
We can begin with Augustine's statement of the doctrine.
All the Catholic interpreters of the divine books, both the Old and
New Testament, whom I have been able to read, who wrote before
me about the Trinity, which is God, had this purpose in view: to
teach in accordance with the Scriptures that the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit constitute a divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality. Therefore, they are not three gods
but one God; although the Father has begotten the Son, and, therefore, He who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son was begotten
by the Father and, therefore, He who is the Son is not the Father; and
the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of
the Father and the Son, and He Himself is also co-equal with the
Father and the Son and belongs to the unity of the Trinity. Not that
this same Trinity was born of the Virgin Mary and was crucified and
buried under Pontius Pilate, nor rose again on the third day, nor
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ascended into heaven, but only the Son. Nor that this Trinity
descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove when He was baptized;
nor that this same Trinity on Pentecost, after the Lord's Ascension,
when a sound came from heaven as if a mighty wind were blowing,
settled upon each one of them with parted tongues of fire, but only
the Holy Spirit. Nor that this same Trinity said from heaven: "Thou
art my son," either when Jesus was baptized by John or when the
three disciples were with Him on the mount, nor when the voice
sounded saying: "I have glorified and I shall glorify again," but this
was the word of the Father only, spoken to the Son; although the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they are inseparable, so they
work inseparably. This is also my faith, since it is the Catholic faith. 3
Augustine is, of course, aware of potential difficulties with this
doctrine. He notes,
But some are troubled in this faith when they hear that the Father is
God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and that this Trinity is
not three gods but one God; and they ask how they are to conceive it,
especially when it is said that the Trinity works inseparably in everything that God works, and yet that in some way the voice of the Father
spoke which is not the voice of the Son; and that no one except the Son
was born in the flesh, suffered, rose again, and ascended into heaven,
and that no one except the Holy Spirit came in the form of a dove:
There are at least two related questions in this passage: (i) How can each
member of the Trinity be God, and yet there be only one God? and (ii)
How can each member of the Trinity be God and yet differ from each
other? These are the questions I mean to take up in this paper.
2. The Quicunque Vult

Before we turn to the project of examining these questions, it will be useful
to have before us some lines from an even more emphatically Trinitarian
statement from later orthodoxy, the so-called Athanasian Creed, or
Quicunque Vult. S

Whoever desires to be saved must above all things hold the Catholic
faith.
Now this is the Catholic faith, that we worship one God in Trinity
and Trinity in unity, without either confusing the persons or dividing
the substance. For the Father's person is one, the Son's another, the
Holy Spirit's another; but the Godhead of the Father, the Son and
Holy Spirit is one ....
Such as the Father is, such is the Son, such also the Holy Spirit. The
Father is increate, the Son increate, the Holy Spirit increate. The
Father is infinite, the Son infinite, the Holy Spirit infinite. The Father
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is eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Spirit eternal. Yet there are not
three eternals, but one eternal.. .. In the same way the Father is
almighty, the Son almighty, the Holy Spirit almighty; yet there are
not three almighties, but one almighty.
Thus the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Spirit God; and yet
there are not three Gods, but there is one God .... Because just as we
are obliged by Christian truth to acknowledge each person separately
both God and Lord, so we are forbidden by the Catholic religion to
speak of three Gods or Lords.
The Father is from none, not made nor created nor begotten. The Son
is from the Father alone, not made nor created but begotten. The
Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, not made nor created nor
begotten but proceeding. So there is one Father, not three Fathers;
one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits.6

3. The Central Claims of the Doctrine and Inconsistency
Both the passage from Augustine and the Quicunque Vult begin with a section that expresses the unity and divinity of the Trinity while insisting on a
distinction between the divine persons, and both selections conclude with
some specific reasons for distinguishing the persons. Both Augustine and
the Quicunque Vult appeal to theological differences deriving from earlier
creeds: only the Son is begotten; only the Spirit proceeds from the other
persons of the Trinity. Augustine, in addition, appeals to different activities attributed to the Persons in scripture: only the Father said, "This is my
Son;" only the Son was crucified; and only the Spirit appeared in the form
of a dove. Incorporating both halves of these passages-those asserting
unity and divinity and those affirming diversity-suggests a way of formulating some central claims about the Trinity, perhaps claims so central as to
constitute a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity. However, even this
rudimentary statement, as we shall see, seems open to the objections
Augustine raises.
Appropriately for an account of the Trinity, there are three different
sorts of claims about the Trinity suggested by these texts. The first fall
under what we might call the
(A) Divinity Condition
Each of the members of the Trinity possesses various of the traditional
divine attributes, for example, omnipotence, eternity, being uncreated, etc.
And each of the members, in addition, is God. The second group of claims
fall under what we might call the
(B) Diversity Condition
The three members of the Trinity are really distinct from one another.
Finally, there is a
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(C) Uniqueness Condition7

Roughly put: for each of the mentioned divine attributes, there is only one
being with that attribute. In particular, there is only one God.
Rather than considering each of the attributions of a divine attribute to
the Persons of the Trinity, I will begin by listing the claims that each is God.
(We will return below to a consideration of the other attributes.) Thus, the
Divinity Condition includes these theses:
(AI) The Father is God,
(A2) The Son is God,
and
(A3) The Holy Spirit is God
The Diversity Condition includes the further claims that
(B4) The Father is not the Son,
(BS) The Father is not the Holy Spirit,

and
(B6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit.
Thus, the three members of the Trinity are distinct from each other.
Finally, the Uniqueness Condition is the claim that
(C7) There is exactly one God. 8
These seven theses appear to be inconsistent. There cannot be three distinct
individuals, each having a certain property which is had by only one thll'g.
Whether these statements really are inconsistent depends, however, on
exactly how they are to be understood. That is a project to which I will
tum in a moment.

4. Without Confusing the Persons
First, however, I want to raise some questions about the Diversity
Condition and the claims that spell it out. Recall that the second question I
attributed to Augustine was the question, How can each member of the
Trinity each be God and yet differ from each other? That presupposes that
the members of the Trinity are different from each other, as the Diversity
Condition insists. To thus interpret these claims as affirming a genuine difference between the members of the Trinity is to take them to be denying
identify. That is, as
(B4') The Father is not identical with the Son,

(BS') The Father is not identical with the Holy Spirit,
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and
(B6') The Son is not identical with the Holy Spirit.
But how could these three all be true? After all, the Quicunque Vult says,
(8) Such as the Father is, such is the Son, such also the Holy Spirit.
That naturally suggests
(9) For any property F, the Father has F iff the Son has F iff the Holy
Spirit has F.
In other words, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have all the same
properties. This interpretation could be supported by one reading of the
Latin text, which states "Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus sanctus."
Our word "quality" derives from the Latin "qualis", after all, so it is tempting to think that Quicunque Vult asserts, as (9) says, that the three members
of the Trinity have all the same qualities or properties. But the trio of
propositions (B4'), (B5'), and (B6') cannot be true if the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit have all the same properties. For by the identity of indiscemibles,

(10) If x and y have the same properties, then x

=

y,

it follows from the assumption that the Father and the Son have all the
same properties that they are identical, and similarly for the Father and the
Spirit, and the Son and the Spirit.
Now (10) is not entirely beyond controversy, but I would say that this is
true only in the way that every substantive philosophical thesis has been
controverted by someone or other. Still, philosophers have been willing to
go to extraordinary philosophical lengths to defend the doctrine of the
Trinity/ so why not deny (10), despite its apparent obviousness? Well, I
would prefer to see if the diversity of the divine Persons can be stated in a
way that does not require denying apparent necessary truths.
Fortunately, there is another way of interpreting (8), one that does not
interpret it as affirming (9). A suggestion may be found in a confessional
statement of my theological tradition, the Belgic Confession. lO Article 8
states,
In keeping with the truth and the Word of God we believe in one
God, who is one single essence, in whom there are three persons,
really, truly, and eternally distinct according to their incommunicable
properties-namely, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. ... Nevertheless, this
distinction does not divide God into three, since Scripture teaches us
that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit each has his own subsistence distinguished by characteristics-yet in such a way that these
three persons are only one God. 11
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This gives us a technical term, but not yet an explanation. The Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit, according to this proposal, do indeed have all of their
properties in common, except, that is, for their incommunicable ones. 12 But
what is an incommunicable property? And does not the Quicunque Vult
rule out exceptions, anyway? The latter question is easier to answer.
Recall that the relevant claim in that document is
(8) Such as the Father is, such is the Son, such also the Holy Spirit.
But (8) need not be read as asserting that the three Persons have all of their
properties in common. As we saw, the Latin,

(11) Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus sanctus.
might be taken to be referring to qualities or properties generally. But a
better interpretation would be
(11') Whatever kind of thing the Father is, the Son is that kind of thing,
and so is the Holy Spirit.
It might be tempting to take "kind of thing" to mean essential property,
where a property F is essential to an individual x just in case x has F but
could not exist while lacking F. But presumably begetting someone is essential to the Father. Accordingly, if we interpret (11') as ranging over all
essential properties, we would have to say that the Son begets someone
and the Spirit does, too. In that case, we would not be able to use the standard way of distinguishing the Persons.
It is fashionable these days to say that what kind of thing something is
depends on what natural kinds it falls under. We should not expect to find
natural kinds here, but perhaps we can appeal to supernatural kinds.
Consider any property that is necessary for being a divine person. Such
properties would include omnipotence, omniscience, being uncreated, perhaps being eternal, and, of course, being a divine person. It is certainly
plausible to think that in saying that a thing has one of these properties
that we are saying what kind of thing it is. For short, let us call such properties "divine attributes".13 Then we could interpret (11) as

(11") For any divine attribute the Father has, the Son has it, and so does
the Holy SpiriV4
So understood, the Creed would allow that the Persons of the Trinity differ
in some properties-the "incommunicable properties"-which is sufficient to
ensure their non-identity, even though they have all of the same divine
attributes. So neither Augustine nor the Quicunque Vult are guilty of an
obvious inconsistency in accepting the Diversity claims, (B4'), (BS'), and
(B6'). We tum next to the other half of the problem: if there are three
divine Persons, each of whom is God, why are not there three Gods?
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5. Divinity and Polytheism
Let us look more closely at the Divinity Condition. The doctrine of the
Trinity holds, as we have seen,
(AI) The Father is God,
(A2) The Son is God,
and
(A3) The Holy Spirit is God.
But then an obvious problem looms: the doctrine seems to be committed to
tritheism. If there are three individuals-not identical with each other, as
our previous discussion has concluded-who are God, then there are three
Gods.
In fact, the problem is even worse, for no doubt orthodox Christianity
holds
(12) The triune God is God.
Augustine writes, for example, that "that the Trinity is the one and only
and true God." lS Cornelius Plantinga echoes this with his assertion that
"God is properly used as a designator of the whole Trinity-three persons in
their peculiar relations to each other."" Moreover, neither the Father nor
the Son nor the Holy Spirit is the same as the Trinity itself. Thus, it looks as
though the doctrine of the Trinity is committed to the existence of at least
four Gods-hence, the title of this paper is "Trinity and Polytheism" rather
than the expected "Trinity and Tritheism."
One way to avoid this problem is to reinterpret the statements of the
Divinity Condition, (AI), (A2), and (A3). The Latin sentence from which
these claims were derived reads

(13) Ita deus Pater, deus Filius, deus Spiritus sanctus. 17
Latin permits the suppression of the verb, and the pairs of nouns 'deus',
'Pater', etc., need not be taken in the order in which they are written. Thus,
instead of taking this sentence to assert that three things, the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit, are each God, we could take it to say that one
thing, God, is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In other words, we could take
the Divinity Claims to be:
(AI') God is a Father,
(A2') God is a Son,
and
(A3') God is a Holy Spirit.ls
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With this interpretation, there is no temptation to think that there are three
(or four) Gods. There is just God, who is a Father, a Son, and a Holy Spirit.
It would be analogous to saying that God is a creator, a redeemer, and a
comforter, or God is strong and just and wise. l " So there is no danger of
polytheism on this interpretation, but that is because there is no
Trinitarianism on this interpretation, either. At best it gives us the modalist heresy, according to which the Father, Son and the Spirit are just modes
or aspects of God. So let us turn to another interpretation of (AI), (A2),
and (A3).
A natural suggestion is to interpret these components of the Divinity
Condition as identity statements, that is, respectively, as
(AI") The Father is identical with God,
(A2") The Son is identical with God,
and
(A3") The Holy Spirit is identical with God.
This proposal only makes matters worse, however. If each of the Father,
the Son, and the Holy Spirit are identical with God, they are all identical
with each other. So, like modalism, this suggestion, does not give us a trinity of divine Persons. Worse, the conjunction of (AI"), (A2"), and (A3")
with the Diversity Claims (B4'), (B5'), and (B6') is logically impossible. It is
plainly impossible for one thing to be identical with three distinct things.
Indeed, in the delightfully irascible phrase found by Keith Yandell, to say
"that there are three Persons who are severally and each of them true God, and
yet there is but one God: this is an Error in counting or numbering; which,
when stood in, is of all others the most brutal and inexcusable; and not to
discern it is not to be a man."'o So it looks like we can escape from polytheism only at the risk of heresy or incoherence.
By now the reader who has gotten this far is likely clamoring for me to
state an obvious, and obviously better, interpretation of the original
Divinity Claims (AI), (A2), and (A3).21 Philosophers commonly distinguish between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication. Why not
apply that distinction to these Divinity claims? In particular, since interpreting the copula in (AI)-(A3) as expressing identity leads so directly to
trouble, why not interpret it instead as making a predication? That is,
instead of thinking of 'is God' as meaning '= God', why not think of it as 'is
divine'? In that case, we can interpret (AI)-(A3) as
(AI''') The Father is divine,
(A2"') The Son is divine,
and
(A3"') The Holy Spirit is divine.

Of course, whether this suggestion will help depends on what property the
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predicate 'is divine' expresses. If, for example, it simply expresses the
property being God, then we have just found a way to rewrite (A1/1t (A2/1),
and (A3/1), the propositions that lead to the brutal and inexcusable error in
counting. But there is no reason to insist on this understanding of 'is
divine'. In fact, we have already discussed divine attributes without being
tempted to think that they are properties that are identical with God. More
importantly, the concept of divine attributes can be employed to explain
the content of "is divine". We noted above that such divine attributes as
omnipotence, omniscience, being uncreated, and perhaps being etemal,22
are plausibly thought to be necessary for being a divine person. Let us
make this explicit and hold that a person is divine just in case that person
has the divine attributes.
The heart of my suggestion then, is that the Divinity Claims (A1)-(A3)
attribute-unsurprisingly-divinity to the three Persons of the Trinity.
Furthermore, there is no contradiction between holding that there are several divine Persons but only one God, provided that what God is is a unity
of these persons. And there is no error in counting here, either. The number of distinct divine persons is three; the number of Gods is one.23

6. English Only?
I tum next to consider two objections to this proposal. The first is the claim
that, although it makes sense to distinguish the 'is' of identity from the 'is'
of predication in English, there is no basis for making that distinction in the
Latin of the Quicunque Vult. There is, of course, something to this objection. After all, as we saw above, the Latin sentence,
(13) Ita deus Pater, deus Filius, deus Spiritus sanctus,

does not even bother to include the copula 'est'. Moreover, 'deus' is definitely a noun; if the Latin had intended to make a predication, it could
have used the adjective 'divinus'.
Nevertheless, I think that a distinction between assertions of identity
and predication is present in the Latin text. To see this, we need to look
back at the series of Divinity Claims that followed the general principle,

(11) Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus sanctus,
which I glossed as,
(11/1) For any divine attribute the Father has, the Son has it, and so does
the Holy Spirit.

Those claims were
(14) The Father is increate, the Son increate, the Holy Spirit increate.
(Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus Spiritus sanctus.)
(15) The Father is infinite, the Son infinite, the Holy Spirit infinite.
(Inmensus Pater, inmensus Filius, inmensus Spiritus sanctus.)
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(16) The Father is eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Spirit eternal.
(Aeternus Pater, aeternus Filius, aetemus Spiritus sanctus.)
(17) The Father is almighty, the Son almighty, the Holy Spirit almighty.
(Omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus sanctus.)
In each case in the Latin we have repeated pairs of an adjective and a noun,
where the adjective is naturally taken as predicating a property of the referent of the noun. Moreover, each line is an instance of the general principle
that any divine attribute of the Father is an attribute of the Son and the
Spirit. So the English translation seems correct in treating each line as a
predication, with the adjective predicating such properties as, being lmcreated, eternal, infinite, and almighty, respectively, of The Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit. (There remains an awkwardness in the second half of each
claim, which I did not quote here, where the adjective is treated as a substantive, for example, there is only one "almighty", not three "almighties".
But that does not detract from this translation of the first half of each claim.)
So each of (14) through (17) is an instance of the general principle (11")
that any divine attribute the Father has is shared with the Son and the
Spirit. But the troublesome

(13) Ita deus Pater, deus Filius, deus Spiritus sanctus
follows immediately after this list. So the most plausible way to interpret
it, like the lines that precede it, is to take the first noun, 'deus' as expressing
a property of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.24 That property is
most naturally taken to be divinity, the property of being divine.
7. Incoherence Regained

So far I have argued in support of this proposal as an interpretation of the
Quicunque Vult. Regardless of how good the proposal is an interpretation
of the Creed, however, it might nevertheless lead to incoherence or an
inexcusable error in counting. An objection to this effect can be found in an
argument that Richard Cartwright gives against a somewhat different
account of the Trinity. He writes,
My argument is very simple: every Divine Person is a God; there are
at least three Divine Persons; therefore, there are at least three Gods.
The first premise is a trivial truth. The second follows from the conjunction of [(AI"'), (A2"'), and (A3"') and (El'), (B2'), and (B3'), the
Divinity and Diversity Claims]. The heretical conclusion follows, by
the general principle that if every A is a B then there cannot be fewer
B's than A's.D
I had suggested that the Divinity Claims (A1)-(A3) attribute divinity to the
three Persons of the Trinity. But Cartwright alleges that any Divine
Person-any person who has the property of divinity, that is-is a God and
that this, furthermore, is a trivial truth. So if there are three divine Persons,
there are three Gods, after all. Formulating the Divinity Claims in the way
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I suggested is thus of no help in resolving the problems.
Is it true, however, that
(18) Necessarily, any divine person is a God?
Well, I do not see that it is true, so I certainly do not believe that it is a trivial truth. What is it to be a God? I suggest that
(19) x is a God iff ($ y)(y

= God & x = y)

That is, something is a God just in case it is God. The Quicunque Vult, however, says, in effect, that something can be a divine Person without being
identical with God. One might have uncritically been inclined to accept
(18), but the Quicunque Vult denies it. One thing I think reflection on the
doctrine of the Trinity does is to call into question such uncritical acceptance. Perhaps, in fact, a thing is identical with God just in case it is a trinity of divine Persons.
It might be helpful here to appeal to an idea presented by Richard of St.
Victor in the twelfth century and recently revived and developed by
Richard Swinburne. The former Richard claims that divine goodness and
love requires that there be more than one divine person. He holds, in the
first place, that "a divine person would not have anyone to love as worthily as himself if he did not have a person of equal worth. However, a person who is not God would not be equal in worth to a divine person.
Therefore, so that fullness of charity might have a place in the true
Divinity, it is necessary that a divine person not lack a relationship with an
equally worthy person, who is, for this reason, divine."2h Richard claims, in
addition, that any such pair of divine persons would need a third equally
worthy being in whom they could cooperate in loving. He writes, "As
long as only the first is loved by the second, he alone seems to possess the
delights of his excellent sweetness. Similarly, as long as the second does
not have someone who shares in love for a third, he lacks the sharing of
excellent joy. In order that both may be able to share delights of this kind,
it is necessary for them to have someone who shares in love for a third."27
For the third to be equally worthy of supreme divine love, the third must
also be a divine person. Since the existence of a third is sufficient to permit
divine persons to share in supreme love, the requirements of supreme
divine love do not provide a reason for the existence of yet more divine
persons.
According to the later Richard,
there is overriding reason for a first God to create a second God and
with him to create a third God, but no reason to go farther. If the
Christian religion has helped us, Christians and non-Christians alike,
to see anything about what is worthwhile, it has helped us to see that
love is a supreme good .... Love must share and love must cooperate
in sharing .... I conclude (tentatively) that necessarily if there is at
least one God, then there are three and only three Gods. 2s
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I do not have space here to give a fuller exposition and discussion of this
line of reasoning. Otherwise, I should certainly want to modify
Swinburne's talk of one God "creating another" and his way of putting the
conclusion that there are "three Gods".29 But I do want to emphasize that if
considerations like these that appeal to the diffusiveness of goodness and,
more importantly, to the nature of a loving God can be used to argue for
the triune nature of God, then the idea that God is a Trinity of divine
Persons will be more attractive. And perhaps it will seem plausible that
not every Divine Person is a God.

8. Conclusion
Jonathan Edwards assessed his own discussion of the Trinity saying, "I
don't pretend fully to explain how these things are and I am sensible a
hundred other objections may be made and puzzling doubts and questions
raised that I can't solve."30 Some of the questions that remain for me are:
What does it mean to say that the members of the Trinity are persons? How
does the doctrine of the Trinity fit with, and what does it require by way
of, metaphysical theories, say, on the nature of substance?31 What does it
mean to say that doctrine of the Trinity is a mystery? Which of the divine
attributes does the triune God have? Edwards continues, with a modesty I
want to share,
I am far from pretending to explaining the Trinity so as to render it
no longer a mystery. I think it to be the highest and deepest of all
divine mysteries still, notwithstanding anything that I have said or
conceived about it. I don't intend to explain the Trinity. But Scripture

with reason may lead [us] to say something further of it than has
been wont to be said, tho there are still left many things pertaining to
it incomprehensible.32
What I have tried to say further is that Trinitarianism is not committed to
polytheism, nor is it incoherent or guilty of poor arithmetic. 33
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